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Capacity, sustainability, and the community benefits of municipal utility ownership in the
United States

Abstract
Most literature on utility sustainability focuses on internal operations; this misses the role
that utilities cold play within a community. This study measures the impact of municipal
ownership of water and electric utilities on the sustainability policymaking of local governments.
I find that municipalities with government-owned water utilities adopt more sustainability
measures than those with investor-owned service. Similarly, municipally-owned electric utilities
have higher levels of energy sustainability in the community, but not in government operations.
The utilities provide fiscal and technical capacity to municipalities. This study brings potential
community benefits to the discussion of private investment in public service delivery.

Keywords: Local government, sustainability policymaking, municipal utilities, electricity, water

Policy Highlights:
• Municipal ownership of electric and water utilities correlates to increased community water
sustainability and community energy sustainability.
• Utilities can provide capacity of local government action on sustainability in the community.
• Interdepartmental coordination also predicts increased sustainability action by a local
government.

Introduction
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Water and electric utilities are intimately tied to sustainability through the nature of their
services. However, most examinations of the benefits or challenges of such service delivery
focus on internal operations. For example, local officials may ask if a water provider delivers a
cleaner product at a lower price? Or how quickly electricity is restored after a blackout? External
community impacts, such as whether the municipality encourages conservation, are rarely
figured into calculations of whether services should be delivered publicly or privately.
At the same time, most local governments in the United States struggle with
sustainability (Svara, 2011). Capacity is a key constraint of any action by local governments
(Thompson, 1965) with more complex issues, such as sustainability, requiring more capacity
(Honadle, 2001). This capacity comes in the form of financial resources or technical expertise.
Previous studies have found the lack of capacity to hinder environmental protection
policymaking by local governments (Lubell, Feiock, & Handy, 2009; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch,
2011). The problem is particularly acute in smaller and rural communities, which do not have the
resources or political will to act on many sustainability issues (Carter & Culp, 2010; Homsy &
Warner, 2015).
Qualitative research in small U.S. cities hints that municipal electric utilities provide an
important alternative revenue source in support of sustainability efforts in otherwise poorly
resourced communities (Homsy, 2018). Municipally-owned electric utilities allow citizens to be
more involved in sustainability discussions, provide local capacity for policymaking, and the
technical resources needed for implementation (Feiock, Yi, Matkin, & Cartes, 2012; Homsy,
2016). Other studies similarly suggest that there are important side benefits to the government
delivery of public services and downsides to private provision. For example, using an index of
64 local services, Warner and Hefetz (2002) found that an increase in private delivery correlates
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to decreased levels of civic engagement and increased inequity. Also, in the United Kingdom
rates of service delivery by the private sector are negatively associated with social equity
(Andrews & Entwistle, 2010).
In this paper, I follow-up and expand upon these preliminary investigations about the
benefits of public ownership of utilities to the greater community using a comprehensive dataset
of policymaking by municipalities around the United States. In the next section, I examine the
literature around the internal and external benefits of either publicly- or investor-owned utilities.
Following the literature review, I present the descriptive results of the national survey and the
methodology for modeling the impact of utility ownership on community sustainability from the
perspective of the municipality, which is my unit of analysis. My findings indicate that municipal
ownership of a water utility positively predicts water sustainability policymaking by that local
government. The presence of a municipal electric company correlates to increased policymaking
by a city or town in the greater community. But, it does not predict increased energy
sustainability policies within local government operations. The study also found cooperation
among local government departments to be a strong predictor of sustainability policymaking.

Public versus private utilities
Since the 1980s, the debate over the privatization of public services has spanned both
ideological and practical spectrums (Sclar, 2000). More than 40 percent of public goods are
delivered by the private sector (Peters, 2012). Privatization of public services results from
general opposition to government involvement in the economic sector, belief in the efficiency of
free markets, and as an easy way to raise large sums of money quickly (Patterson, 2013). The
World Bank and International Monetary Fund support privatization to raise funds to reduce debt
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and to alleviate the perceived inefficiencies of public operations (Basu & Miroshnik, 2015). The
massive financial investment required in aging water systems drives the calls for privatization in
developed countries, especially in response to increased European or US quality standards (Dore,
Kushner, & Zumer, 2004; Lieberherr & Fuenfschilling, 2016; National Research Council, 2002).
Local government leaders in the U.S. make pragmatic decisions around whether or not to
outsource service delivery (Kim & Warner, 2016). The cost-benefit analysis of privatization is
situational and based on factors such as community size, structure of local government, market
conditions, and scale of services provided (Bel & Warner, 2015; Pérez-López, Prior, ZafraGómez, & Plata-Díaz, 2016). In addition to financial considerations, local leaders examine
whether or not the public or private provision of services, including power and water utilities,
aligns with the public values and institutions (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). Public
officials have to balance a variety of stakeholder values, which traditionally have included issues
of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, accountability, and service quality. Constraining community
values are the existing institutions (laws and organizations).
Within the realm of publicly-owned utility companies, governance structure varies. Many
operate as city departments (or as sub-units of, for example, a department of public works),
which report to elected officials. They can also be independent city agencies, city-owned
corporations, utility districts, or regional authorities (Baer, Edelman, Ingram III, & Mahnovski,
2001). There also exist various forms of privatization that result in different degrees of
ownership and risk assumption. For water utilities in the United States, the four most prominent
are: the outsourcing of specific support services; contracting operations of publicly-owned
facilities; integrating private design, build, and operation of expanded facilities; and the outright
sale of facilities to private water companies (National Research Council, 2002).
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Similarly, regulatory schemes for both public and private utilities vary across countries
and among states in the United States. Regulation of utilities, since they often involve large
investments in fixed assets, must protect consumers, who rely on the safe and consistent delivery
of a service, as well as offer investors (or taxpayers in the case of publicly-owned ventures) the
assurance that the financial investment will be relatively secure. In the United States, privatelyowned water utilities are regulated for water quality and public health standards by state
governments pursuant to the national Safe Drinking Water Act (National Research Council,
2002). Nearly all states also set economic regulations, which control prices and profits of these
monopolistic operations. In most states, publicly-owned utilities are not subject to economic
regulations (Beecher & Kalmbach, 2013). Regulation of water service across European nationstates is similarly decentralized and varied with most countries seeking to deal with operations
and asset management and pricing (Boscheck, 2013).
In the U.S., investor-owned electric utilities are governed by rules set out by state utility
commissions; a few states extend these to publicly-owned utilities. The rules revolve around
rates and profit controls. Many states regulate sources of power (portfolio standards) often to
encourage renewable power production. About half of state governments also impose energy
efficiency standards (Lazar, 2016). Prices vary from state to state within the United States
depending upon fuel source, regulation, and other factors. This differs significantly from
electricity governance in the European Union where legislation over the years had sought to
create an interconnected continent with a convergence of prices and a requirement for the
universal provision of service to all households (Erbach, 2016).

U.S. Electricity Provision
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In 2014, the 2,012 electric municipal utilities represented 60.9 percent of all power
companies in the United States, but provided electricity to only 14.5 percent of customers
(American Public Power Association, 2017). Although some big cities, such as Los Angeles,
California, Seattle, Washington, Orlando, Florida, and Austin, Texas have government-owned
power companies, the vast majority of the publicly-owned electric companies serve 10,000
customers or fewer. Most of the municipally-owned power companies must purchase power;
only 31.9 percent produce any of their own electricity and, of those, nearly three-quarters (72%)
generate five megawatts or less. By contrast, there are 187 invest-owned utilities that provide
power to over two-thirds (68.3%) of customers in the United States.
The prime period of growth for government-owned power companies waned in the early
20th century. Before 1937, the majority of the power in three states and at least 20 percent of
electricity in 14 others was generated by municipal utilities (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011). Private
utilities originally focused on large cities, commercial establishments, and the homes of the
wealthy. Municipal operations emerged to provide power to rural communities and common
people as well as to counter the growing economic and political clout of the investor-owned
operations (Rudolph, 2016). Many municipal electric utilities served as money making ventures
for cities in order to support other operations (MacKillop, 2005).
The growth of municipal power stopped in the early 1920s and private power companies
boomed as utilities and their holding companies became a favorite financial instrument. Leaders
among private power companies and equipment makers colluded to prevent government-owned
utilities from growing (Granovetter & McGuire, 1998). Private utilities allowed themselves to be
regulated as a monopoly and this blunted public criticism as people and businesses were
interested in stable rates and reliable service rather than the battle between public or private
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operations (Rudolph, 2016). Large electric grids with multiple points of generation became
technically possible and economically more efficient (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011). This played
to the advantage of investor-owned utilities because most publicly-owned ones were restricted to
serving customers within their municipal borders (Rudolph, 2016).
The number of publicly-owned power companies grew again in the middle of the century
with the support of Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. However, the private
companies roared back during the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower, who sought
to dismantle the federal power projects that favored municipal utilities. In the 1980s, in the U.S.
rising rates caused by nuclear plant construction incentivized a small number of local
governments to municipalize their power companies (Rudolph & Ridley, 1986) though the larger
result was deregulation in many states. More recently, Boulder, Colorado voted to municipalize
their power system in order to forward their goal of becoming a carbon neutral city (Rudolph,
2016). However, from about 1983 to 2013 only 59 government-owned utilities formed
(American Public Power Association, 2013).
The impact of power companies within communities is not well studied. Nearly all of the
literature focuses on the environmental or social impact of utility operations. A number of the
publicly-owned utilities in big cities have established themselves as leaders in renewable energy
production, though the broad finding that municipal utilities hold more renewable energy in their
portfolios may be due to investments in hydropower (Heiman & Solomon, 2004). One
quantitative analysis found that the presence of a municipal utility reduced the community’s
likelihood having signed the Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement (Krause, 2011) and another
found that municipal utilities drive community-wide energy sustainability efforts (Homsy, 2016).
Investments in solar energy by private power companies are negatively correlated to a firm’s
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financial performance (Ruggiero & Lehkonen, 2017). However, even publicly-owned power
companies that undertake overseas commercial operations shift away from sustainability values
to more profit-driven ones when they leave their home countries (Clifton, Fuentes, & Warner,
2016).
The most important community benefit discussed in the literature is the potential for
economic development based upon lower costs of power from municipal electric utilities. From
the beginning, government-provided power has been cheaper than the electricity from private
sector operations (Rudolph, 2016). The lower rates are touted as attractive to industries, and
municipal utilities were often established to encourage economic development and city
expansion (MacKillop, 2005). The American Public Power Association (2017) compiled data
showing that in 2014 publicly-owned power companies charged 14 percent less to residential
customers than investor-owned utilities. The difference in commercial electricity rates is
narrower: 11.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for customers investor-owned utilities versus 10.7 cents
for government-owned companies. In a handful states, such as Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Maryland, and Nevada, public power prices are much lower than those of investor-owned
utilities. In 12 states, the average publicly-owned rate was slightly above that of investor-owned
utilities.
Another advantage noted in the literature is that government-ownership can give citizens
control over the kinds of power generated. For example, citizen pressure forced municipal
utilities in Seattle, Washington and Austin, Texas to not participate or to sell off investments in
nuclear projects (Rudolph, 2016). As a result, these utilities developed aggressive communitywide conservation programs. Burlington, Vermont’s publicly-owned utility became a leader in
energy efficiency only after an outcry by citizens. At the same time municipally-owned power
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companies have better relationships with their customers, which facilitates the increased
marketing of energy conservation programs (Wilson, Plummer, Fischlein, & Smith, 2008).
Literature on social sustainability and utilities is thin and usually describes the challenges
of reaching low income households with energy efficiency. For example, Bird and Hernández
(2012) find that the split incentive problem, in which renters pay utility bills while landlords
must bear the costs of energy efficiency improvements, is the main reason that weatherization
programs have had very low penetration among low income households. In addition, low income
households have been underserved by utility conservation programs because residents lack the
money to make initial improvements (Evens, 2015). Over time, the poorer energy customers will
be bear the burden of increased solar installations, which drive up the fixed costs of power
production that utilities will pass on to customers (Oppenheim, 2016).

U.S. Drinking Water Provision
The ownership profile of water utilities is the opposite that of electric companies in the
United States. While neoliberal reforms have allowed privatization in much of the power,
transportation, and telecommunications markets, the water sector remains largely a governmentowned operation due to its nature as an essential public good with expensive infrastructure
requirements and sensitivity to environmental threats (Lieberherr & Fuenfschilling, 2016).
Although the private provision of water has grown since the beginning of the 21st century
(Varghese, 2007), by 2014, for-profit companies operated only 46 percent of U.S. water systems
and served only 12 percent of customers (Food and Water Watch, 2016). Governments owned 51
percent of the systems while providing drinking water to 87 percent of the U.S. population.
(These numbers exclude individual systems, usually wells.) From 2007 to 2014 the portion of the
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population served by municipal utilities rose about three percent.
Privatization of the aging water systems across developed countries seeks to bring new,
non-governmental investment in desperately needed infrastructure improvements (Lieberherr &
Fuenfschilling, 2016). The nature of water makes it a challenging good for privatization as it
remains inexpensive to customers compared to its value for life and its cost of transportation
(Solomon, 2011). In places, fiscal constraints and the devolution of financial responsibilities
exacerbated the capacity limits facing local governments seeking to upgrade water systems – and
pushed the hunt for alternatives (Furlong, 2016).
In the United States, water systems most likely to privatize were in municipalities with
middle income residents, which may indicate that private suppliers seek communities who can
afford rate increases, but without significant political influence (Greiner, 2016). In the United
Kingdom, privatization set off a wave of re-regulation as a backlash to the private operation’s
environmental and social impacts, such as water service disconnections, cherry-picking of the
most lucrative areas to provide service, and the increased risks to public health (Lieberherr &
Fuenfschilling, 2016). However, even public utilities face justice issues, such as in Detroit where
thousands of low-income families had their water shut off or Chicago where water rates rose 45
percent over three years (Vanderwarker, 2012). Case studies of utilities in Zurich, Berlin, and
Leeds indicate a potential tradeoff among the three sustainability dimensions: privately owned
operations tend to be more economically efficient at the expense of the environment and social
justice while publicly-owned water utilities sacrifice economic efficiency in favor of the other
two values (Lieberherr & Truffer, 2015).
As with electric utilities, the examination of benefits associated with public or private
ownership of water companies focuses on the operations themselves. Investor-owned water
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utilities in Europe tend to be more innovative than their public counterparts, but do less in terms
of sustainability (Lieberherr & Truffer, 2015). Smaller utilities struggle with broad sustainability
goals due to technical and fiscal limitations as well as lacking access to industry-wide standards
in areas outside of public health (Haider, Sadiq, & Tesfamariam, 2016). Landis (2015) surveyed
125 water utilities across North America and, without reporting on differences by ownership,
found that only 18 percent had a sustainability policy or vision statement and only four percent
had a sustainability coordinator. Nearly half (46%) employed no internal sustainability metrics.
Despite the energy intensive nature of most water utility operations, only 30 percent have
undertaken energy audits or energy conservation strategies. A multi-state study of utilities (n=80)
in the Midwest, again without differentiating by ownership, found that the vast majority did not
have rate structures conducive to conservation; 60 percent charged customers lower rates with
higher water usage and another 31 percent held the rates constant regardless of amount of water
used with a few more private utilities having such conservation discouraging policies. Just over
two-thirds of the utilities (71%) provided conservation information to customers. The study also
found that 11 percent of utilities have discounts for low-income customers; 10 percent have
senior discounts; and 26 percent offer some kind of payment assistance program (Beecher &
Kalmbach, 2013).

Measuring municipal utilities and the local sustainability landscape
The unit of analysis in this study is the local or county government. My measures of the
community benefits are three additive indices of local government sustainability policies drawn
from the 2015 Local Government Sustainability Practices Survey conducted with the
International City/County Management Association. The survey frame consisted of all counties,
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all municipalities and townships over 25,000 in population and a one in 2.5 sample of
municipalities and townships with between 2,500 and 24,999 people. The survey was mailed to
the chief administrative officer of all 8,562 local governments in this universe and had a response
rate of 22.2 percent with 1,899 counties and municipalities responding. After cleaning returns
and matching them with U.S. Census data, I ended up with 1,839 observations in the sample.

Dependent variables
Tables one through three show descriptive statistics for the components of each of the
dependent variables used in this study. The three dependent variables are additive indices of
policies adopted by local governments in three areas: water sustainability, energy sustainability
in local government operations, and energy sustainability in the community.

[Insert Tables 1, 2 & 3 about here.]

Independent variables
The main independent variable of interest is the presence of a municipal utility, based on
survey questions asking whether or not the respondent’s community owned their own electricity
or water utility. In model one, which examines the predictors of water sustainability, the
presence of a publicly-owned water utility is used. In the other two models, I use the presence of
a publicly-owned electric company. Only 10.3 percent of respondents owned their power
company while 55.9 percent of water utilities did. I expect that the presence of a municipal water
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utility or a municipal electric utility will be positively correlated to increased rates of
sustainability policies adopted by the local government.
The second independent variable measures state influence. In the United States, the
policy options of local governments are limited by the rules of their particular state. Also, many
states govern the actions of utilities operating within their borders. This variable is an additive
index of state-level conservation policies and regulations. The state influence score for the water
model is derived from The Water Efficiency and Conservation State Scorecard (Christiansen et
al., 2012). The state influence score for electricity policy is a count of climate mitigation and
energy conservation policies compiled by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2011). I
expect that state influence scores will be positively correlated to sustainability outcomes.
The third variable is an indication of whether or not departments within the local
government cooperate on water or energy sustainability. Sustainability requires collaboration
across administrative units. The data come from two questions on the 2015 sustainability survey.
For electricity, the survey asks whether there is cooperation on energy planning. For water, the
question was about collaboration on stormwater management. I expect that collaboration across
department silos will increase the sustainability of particular places.
The fourth group of variables deals with capacity. The property tax dependence variable
is calculated from 2012 U.S. Census of Government data (property tax revenue / total revenue).
The council manager variable comes from ICMA records supplemented with additional research
to fill in missing places. The percent with a bachelor’s degree comes from the 2015 U.S.
American Community Survey Five-Year Estimates. The percent of communities reporting staff
dedicated to sustainability comes from the sustainability survey. I expect that all of these
variables will be positively correlated to sustainability as demonstrated in previous studies.
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The fifth variable category is metropolitan status. Previous studies have found that urban
areas will be more likely to have more sustainability policies than suburban and rural areas.
Finally, I use as control variables population size, population density, and percent of the
population that identifies as white; all of these come the 2010 U.S. Census. The descriptive
statistics for these variables are found in Table 4.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Estimation Procedure
I ran three separate models, one for each dependent variable, to examine the role of the
presence of a municipal utility and other predictors on local government sustainability
policymaking. I used the same sample of 1,839 local and county governments for each model.
The dependent variables are comprised of count data that have an over-dispersed Poisson
distribution. Therefore, I employed a negative binomial regression model. The likelihood ratio
test that alpha equals zero is significant confirming that the negative binomial model is a more
appropriate fit than a Poisson one. Since state governments are the main regulators of utilities in
the United States, I also controlled for states in order to account for various political
environments and regulatory effects that would not show up in the state influence score
independent variable. The results are presented in Table 5 as incident rate ratios, which, in this
case, means the change in predicted count of policies when the particular independent variable
increases by one unit.

[Insert Table 5 about here.]
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Limitations
The study has important limitations. First, as previously described, both publicly- and
privately-owned utilities come in various governance and corporate forms. Testing the impact of
these structures on financial and sustainability outcomes is beyond the scope of the current study
and a topic of future research. Second, despite the sample size, a Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test
indicates that the largest municipalities in the sample (100,000 or more) and the smallest (under
25,000) are slightly overrepresented while the communities between 25,000 and 99,999 are
underrepresented. In the sample, 15 percent of communities were principal cities or counties, 54
percent suburbs, and 30 percent rural communities. Urban and suburban jurisdictions are
somewhat overrepresented and rural underrepresented. Finally, there is likely a self-selection
bias towards places that undertake sustainability actions, though this limitation may also
strengthen the final result as I am testing whether local governments with municipal utilities
adopt more sustainability policies. The bias towards more sustainable communities may make a
positive finding more robust.

Drivers of municipal sustainability
The main independent variable of interest is whether or not the local government owns
the water or energy utility. In two of the three models the presence of the municipal utility is
significant, and it is a strong and positive predictor of increased numbers of municipal policies
with regards to water sustainability actions and community-wide sustainability actions. It is not
significant with regards to energy sustainability policies undertaken by the local government,
such as installing solar panels on government buildings or conducting energy audits of
government facilities and operations. (See Table 2 for the full list.) The findings confirm the
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differing role of municipal utilities with regards to municipal electric utilities using a different
dataset (Homsy, 2016).
Why might municipal utilities predict increased community-wide policies, but not
sustainability policies within government operations? First, making government energy
operations more efficient has a direct impact on the bottom line of any municipality. Although
some places may have a hard time making initial investments in energy upgrades, the payoff for
is easy for local leaders to recognize and to tout – with or without a municipal utility driving the
change. Second, it is relatively easier for government to change its own operations than to work
on changes in the private sector, where returns from initial public investments may not be
quickly realized by the local government. Community values around renewable energy and
conservation can vary dramatically and local leaders must walk a fine line when spending
municipal funds to support community resident or business sector efforts.
A third factor might be the need for greater capacity to handle the more complex
challenge of community-wide energy sustainability. In the second model, which examines
government energy sustainability, municipal utilities do not play a role, but other capacity
variables do. Both property tax dependence and the presence of a city manager, two standard
capacity variables, are only significant in this second model and not the others. This
juxtaposition between the presence of a municipal electric utility and two standard capacity
variables provides support for the notion that municipal utilities provide important technical and
fiscal capacity to carry out a variety of sustainability actions – without a publicly-owned utility
local governments that do adopt energy sustainability policies in the community rely on other
avenues of capacity for implementation. The presence of sustainability staff is significant in all
models, which is consistent with previous research about the importance of this technical and
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administrative capacity. The percent of the population with a college degree is also significant in
all of the models, which is common among studies using this as a proxy for citizen capacity.
Interdepartmental cooperation is significant in the three models. Policy integration across
administrative silos is theoretically important to sustainability action (Feiock, Krause, &
Hawkins, 2017). The current effort is the one of the first studies to empirically examine the
impact of interdepartmental collaboration on sustainability. Perhaps communities more inclined
to promote sustainability policy also tend to be more collaborative. Also, with their cash flow
and expertise, municipal utilities may be attractive collaborators around sustainability issues in
city government. This administrative aspect of sustainability requires more empirical
investigation.
The role of the state is not significant in any of the models. This runs counter to previous
findings (Homsy & Warner, 2015), which indicate that sustainability often requires the state to
create a political environment conducive to action as well as supply funding and expertise. With
regards to energy and water utilities, state rules often govern internal operations, for example, a
minimum amount of renewable power or investment in water conservation measures. The
narrowness of the dependent variables might explain this deviation from past studies, which look
at a broader set of sustainability policies. Also, the dataset may be biased towards places that act
on sustainability, especially on this limited set of policies, and this may cover up any role that the
state may have in pushing a green agenda.
The size of a municipality is significant and positive in all three models. Density is
significant in the energy sustainability in government operations model though the coefficient
indicates that the size of the relationship is small. The percentage of the population that is white
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is insignificant in all three models. In the government operations model, suburban and rural
communities adopt fewer sustainability policies.

The Role for Municipal Utilities
This study confirms the important role that municipal utilities – both water and energy –
can have as actors within a community around the issue of sustainability. Local governments,
after the Great Recession, must find alternative ways to fund the kinds of public services they
provide (Kim & Warner, 2016). The low rate of sustainability policy adoption (Svara, 2011)
indicates that local leaders have trouble prioritizing these sustainability values over more
immediate and traditional quality of life concerns. The challenge is particularly acute in smaller
communities, which the research shows have harder times adopting sustainability policies and
the results here indicate may be struggling with both the fiscal and technical capacity.
Local values may be driving re-municipalization of utilities in Europe. Since the turn of
the 21st century, water delivery in France and electricity delivery in Germany have increasingly
been provided by local governments (Hall, Lobina, & Terhorst, 2013). In 2000, 80 percent of
Germany’s electricity and 75 percent of France’s water was delivered by private companies.
Since then, five major French water providers, covering about five million people, have been
taken over by the public with no providers moving to the private sector. In Germany there have
been 162 re-municipalizations of power companies and none in the opposite direction. In both
nations, three reasons drove the changes: the expiration of existing private contracts, customer
mistrust over prices and performance, and the rise of green politicians and sustainability values
among the populace.
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Such a radical change is not expected in the United States. One of the most prominent remunicipalizations in recent years was in Boulder, Colorado as the citizens grew frustrated with
their investor-owned utility’s unwillingness to align practices with rising sustainability values.
The debate on whether to take over the electric company was contentious (Driskell, 2012) and
the transition has been anything but smooth. With costs of municipalization mounting, Boulder
put the takeover on the ballot again in 2017 – for the third time in seven years. Once again voters
supported the re-municipalization effort (Burness, 2017). Boulder’s experience demonstrates the
potential for a community to promote its environmental values with a locally owned utility
(Crandall, Bailey, Gichon, & Koehn, 2014), although the struggles and costs incurred by one of
the most progressive cities in the United States does not bode well for other re-municipalization
efforts.
Instead, the case for municipal utilities may lie in the unrealized potential of these
organizations in smaller, under-resourced communities. The Poisson distribution of the
dependent variables (the counts of sustainability actions) indicates that most of the values are
low. For the 1,027 places in the sample with a publicly-owned water utility, the median number
of water sustainability policies is 1 and the mean is 1.4, out of a range of 0 to 6. Similarly, the
190 communities with a municipal electric company average only 1.6 community-wide energy
policies with a median of three; and this is out of a possible 17 policies. Despite the results that
show the importance of publicly-owned utilities as a driver, there are obviously many places
where the utility is not pushing for sustainability. In these places, the revenues may either go to
keeping electricity or water costs down (which is a potentially anti-conservation approach) or
into the general budget to offset other costs of running a government. Local leaders may not
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recognize the sustainability asset they have, may not care to pursue such an agenda, or have such
a fragmented governance environment that money and talent cannot be easily repurposed.
Another possible reason for the lack of action in communities with municipal utilities is
that promoting sustainability can work against their immediate financial self-interest. Water and
energy conservation is counter-intuitive when your business is to sell these as products (Homsy,
2016). The return on investments, for example, in renewable power or grey water re-use systems
may take too long to be realized. In many places, the balance of values shifts to economic
efficiency over sustainability, especially with cash-strapped local governments tapping into the
utility revenue stream for more traditional community needs.
The previous point indicates a number of important areas of future research. In places
with publicly-owned water and public utilities, what drives people to act? Do local leaders or
citizens push sustainability and see municipal utilities as a vehicle for implementation? Or can
municipal utilities initiate sustainability actions on their own? What role does the local nature of
the utility play versus the public ownership? For example, could a local privately-owned utility
have the same impact? Would a public-private partnership allow community values around
issues of sustainability to be merged with the efficiencies and capital investment potential of the
private sector? At the same time, there are a variety of ownership structures of municipal
utilities. How different might the sustainability actions of those that are municipal departments
be from those that are standalone authorities or those that have more corporatized operations?
Another important area of future research is the effectiveness of consumer collective purchasing
organizations, known as community energy projects, in which the members seek to influence
environmental and social policies of providers. These have the potential to be broad social
movements rather than just local efforts (Becker, Kunze, & Vancea, 2017). An evaluation of
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rural electrical and other cooperatives as representative of community sustainability values (or
not) is also warranted.
Such ongoing research is crucial as two major developments are pending. First, in the
electricity sector, new renewable technologies as well as smart grids or distributed systems
means that practitioners and scholars will have to soon rethink the operations of utilities and their
role in communities. With these changes, existing and current industrial operators will jockey for
power and market position (Hess, 2013). Much of the discussion will likely focus on the tension
between utilities values and the sustainability values of certain communities. Second, and
similarly, massive infrastructure investments will be needed to maintain the drinking water
system in the United States and in other developed countries around the world. There is likely to
be a push to fund those improvements through private sector operations including public-private
partnerships, which can be structured numerous ways and which may provide public service
operations with the investment and technical expertise for needed infrastructure transitions
(Delmon, 2017). As governments weigh whether or not to bring the private sector deeper into
utility operations, the calculation must be more than financial. In this paper I have shown that
important community benefits of municipal ownership can be seen and need to be part of the
public versus private service delivery discussion.
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